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Fordyce set up all night settling his books and affairs in con-
templation of absconding .... [H]e inclosed [the money] in a
letter to Mr. Fishar as follows: . . ."Mr. Fordyce conceiving
that the money [loaned] by Mr. Fishar... was a sum, about
which perhaps even some pains have been taken to place it
there, he has the honour to shew him that preference which
he conceives is certainly his due."
About six o'clock the same morning Fordyce absconded and
went to France.
Harman v Fishar, 1 Cowp 117, 118 (KB 1774).
Fordyce's other creditors were able to recover the money he
sent his friend Fishar just before absconding (thereby committing
an "act of bankruptcy"') on the grounds that the transfer was a
fraudulent preference. Although outside of bankruptcy Fordyce
might be able to prefer one creditor who was a friend over another
who was not, he was not free to do so when bankruptcy was
imminent.
Today bankruptcy cases commence with the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition,2 which marks the transition from the ordinary le-
gal regime of individual creditors' rights and remedies to the bank-
ruptcy regime of collective creditors' rights and remedies. The
preference and fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code' are the lineal descendants of such eighteenth-century
t B.A. 1985, Amherst College; B.A. 1987, Oxford University; J.D. Candidate 1991, The
University of Chicago.
I Harman, 1 Cowp at 118, 119.
2 Under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC § 101 et seq (1988), corporations or individuals
can file petitions under Chapter 7 (Liquidation) or Chapter 11 (Reorganization), and indi-
viduals can also file petitions under Chapter 13 (Adjustment). A petition may be filed by the
debtor (voluntary) or by a creditor of the debtor (involuntary). A creditor's petition requires
a showing of cause, i.e., either that the debtor has failed to pay debts as they came due or
that, within 120 days prior to the filing, a custodian was appointed or took possession of
substantially all of the debtor's property. 11 USC § 303(h).
Enacted in 1978, the Code replaced the Bankruptcy Act, first passed in 1898 and
amended frequently in the intervening years. The text of the Act was previously codified as
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cases as Harman v Fishar.4 This Comment investigates asset trans-
fers involving an insider of the debtor that raise concerns of prefer-
ential or fraudulent conduct similar to those evoked by Fordyce's
eve-of-bankruptcy transfer to Fishar. It argues that transfers made
by or for the benefit of insiders should be subject to close scrutiny
under the fraudulent conveyance provision as well as the prefer-
ence provision of the Code. Just as common-law judges found
transfers such as the one in Harman to violate the norms of fraud-
ulent conveyance law, even in the absence of a specific rule gov-
erning preferences, so too modern judges should ask whether trans-
fers that benefit insiders violate these norms even though they fall
outside the ambit of preference law.
In Harman, Fishar was a creditor of Fordyce and Co., a part-
nership. Under the Code, Fordyce would be an "insider" of the
partnership.5 The Code specifically addresses preferential and
fraudulent conduct by insiders because of their ability to control
the debtor's funds.6 Under § 547 of the Code (the "preference pro-
vision"), pre-bankruptcy transactions that prefer one creditor over
others of the same class can be avoided by the bankruptcy trustee.'
Section 548 (the "fraudulent conveyance provision") proscribes
any debtor's pre-filing transfers that harm the creditors as a group
without a corresponding benefit to the debtor." The trustee's power
11 USC § 1 et seq.
4 See, for example, Granfinanciera, S.A. v Nordberg, 109 S Ct 2782, 2791 (1989) (citing
Harman).
' The Comment uses the term "insider" consistent with its statutory definition in the
Code. In essence, § 101(30) defines an insider as a director, officer, partner, controlling per-
son of the debtor, or a relative of such individuals. 11 USC § 101(30).
6 Both the fraudulent conveyance and the preference have a lengthy historical lineage
dating back to early English bankruptcy laws. For an overview of the historical evolution of
these laws, see In re Hall, 4 Am Bankr Reps 671, 679-92 (W D NY 1900); Robert Weisberg,
Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Prefer-
ence, 39 Stan L Rev 3 (1986); and Garrard Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences
(Baker & Voorhis 2d ed, 1940 & Supp 1950).
The requirements of § 547 are set forth in text at notes 15-16.
' The essential provisions of 548, discussed in greater detail in Section III of this Com-
ment, are set forth in the text at note 66.
The classic fraudulent conveyance is a gift to relatives before filing for bankruptcy.
Such conduct has been a common ruse of debtors since at least the Middle Ages. See I.
Treiman, Escaping the Creditor in the Middle Ages, 43 Law Quarterly Rev 230, 232-36
(1927). Fraudulent conveyances also violate non-bankruptcy provisions common in many
state corporate law statutes. See, for example, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act §§ 4, 5
(1984). The bankruptcy trustee can invoke the applicable state fraudulent conveyance law.
11 USC § 544(b).
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to recover such transfers derives from § 550 (the "liability
provision") ."
Absent the causes of action created by §§ 547 and 548 and the
recovery power granted in § 550, creditors might prematurely dis-
mantle business entities whose precarious financial condition is
only temporary. Alternatively, debtors, anticipating imminent
bankruptcy, might defraud creditors by transferring company as-
sets, thus exacerbating the creditors' race for the debtor's assets.'0
The Code seeks to create the proper incentives for parties to join,
rather than evade, the collective proceeding. It attempts to maxi-
mize the pool of available assets through incentives and clear rules
of conduct.1'
Critical to the effectiveness of the Code is attention to the
substance rather than form of transactions. 2 If creditors can use
alternative financial arrangements to evade the formal provisions
of the Code, the legal rules are reduced to a roadmap for escaping
bankruptcy proceedings and causing the harms noted above.
This Comment investigates the courts' failure to characterize
transfers involving insiders according to their substantive impact.
It illustrates how, by drawing upon analogous areas of corporate
law to help characterize these transactions, courts can deter con-
duct that violates the principles of the Code. Section I discusses
the courts' current treatment of a common three party financial
" Section 550 provides, in relevant part, that "the trustee may recover, for the benefit
of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property
from-(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer
was made." 11 USC § 550(a)(1). Section 550 establishes liability for various avoided trans-
fers, including preferences and fraudulent conveyances. Section 550(c) limits the trustee to a
single satisfaction of any avoided transfer.
1o The debtor would be harmed in other ways as well. If the trustee were forced to
challenge numerous transactions, litigation costs would multiply. See Douglas G. Baird and
Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 Vand L Rev
829, 849 (1985) (discussing wastefulness and expense of individual creditor remedies). More
importantly, the long-term damage to a firm from a temporary transfer of property could
significantly affect the debtor's financial viability.
" These principles are widely recognized by courts, although their application has led
to inconsistent results. Compare Levit v Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., 874 F2d 1186,
1194-95 (7th Cir 1989) ("Deprizio"), and Matter of Midwestern Companies, Inc., 96 Bankr
224, 225 (Bankr W D Mo 1988), aff'd, 102 Bankr 169 (W D Mo 1989). See generally, Thomas
H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 124-26 (Harvard, 1986).
12 At least in their rhetoric, courts have long recognized the Code's concern for the
substance of transactions. See, for example, National Bank of Newport v National
Herkimer County Bank, 225 US 178, 184 (1912) (applying prior Act); Aulick v Largent, 295
F2d 41, 49-51 (4th Cir 1961) (same); Matter of Compton, 831 F2d 586, 591-92 (5th Cir
1987), remanded after reh'g, 835 F2d 584 (5th Cir 1988) (citing Newport and applying
Code); and In re C-L Cartage, 70 Bankr 928, 932-34 (Bankr E D Tenn 1987), rev'd, 1990
WL 35494 (6th Cir 1990).
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arrangement, in which a debtor's insider guarantees a creditor's
loan to the debtor. This discussion illustrates the courts' often
faulty reasoning in such cases and proposes a more coherentchar-
acterization, one that focuses on the insider's peculiar ability to
control the transaction. Section II explores shortcomings in the
ability of the proposed approach and existing preference law gen-
erally to avoid transactions whose substance violates the primary
objectives of the Code; the section concludes that, where transfers
involving benefits to insiders are at issue, a singular focus on the
rule-like requirements of preference law will not always identify
transfers whose substance is essentially fraudulent or preferential.
Rather, as Section III recommends, existing preference law must
be complemented by the more expansive provisions of fraudulent
conveyance law. In sum, by characterizing these transactions in
terms of fraudulent conveyance law, established doctrines of corpo-
rate law, and the historical concept of fraudulent preferences,
courts can apply the Code more consistently to prevent the harm
to creditors often inflicted by three party transaction involving
insiders.
I CHARACTERIZING THREE-PARTY TRANSACTIONS: THE DISPUTE
OVER § 550
Suppose that Bank, concerned about the financial condition of
Debtor or perhaps seeking to obtain greater influence over
Debtor's use of its funds, requires Insider, a principal officer of
Debtor, to guarantee Bank's loan to Debtor. Insider in turn has
rights of reimbursement and subrogation against Debtor in the
event that Insider is forced to pay Bank.13 As Debtor encounters
financial difficulties, it falls behind in payments to Bank. Antici-
pating default by Debtor and consequent personal liability to
Bank, Insider uses Debtor's funds to pay Bank on the ninety-first
day prior to filing, 4 thus reducing or extinguishing the outstanding
balance of the loan.
13 See 11 USC § 509. Subrogation allows the insider to stand in the shoes of the credi-
tor whose claim he pays; reimbursement provides that the insider can file a claim in his own
right against the debtor for the amount paid to the creditor under the guarantee.
" The ninety-first day is used here to illustrate one problematic aspect of preference
law under the Code. Section 547 contains various "hard edge" requirements, including fixed
reachback periods for insiders (one year) and non-insiders (ninety days). To qualify as a
preference, a transfer must satisfy all the criteria of § 547. If this hypothetical transfer




This transfer has the form of a preference under § 547, which
permits the trustee to avoid a transfer when, among other things,
the transfer is "to or for" the benefit of a creditor, is on account of
an antecedent debt owed by the debtor, and occurs while the
debtor is insolvent.1" The transfer must also occur outside the ordi-
nary course of business and on or within ninety days of the bank-
ruptcy filing or, if the creditor is an insider of the debtor, on or
within a year of the filing. 6
Insider is a creditor of Debtor because his rights of reimburse-
ment constitute a contingent claim against Debtor.17 But this alone
does not make the transfer of Debtor's funds by Insider a voidable
preference, because "transfer" is a defined term in the Code, whose
existence turns on what Debtor pays rather than that which Bank
or Insider receives; and while Bank has received a transfer of
Debtor's property, Insider has not. 8
This distinction, however, is not fatal to the establishment of a
preference because § 547 avoids transfers "to or for the benefit of a
creditor." The transfer to Bank certainly benefits Insider: every
dollar paid by Debtor to Bank reduces Insider's contingent liability
by an equal amount. The other requirements of § 547 being met by
assumption, this transfer is a preference to Insider and the pay-
ments made to Bank during the extended twelve-month reachback
period can be recovered under § 547(b)(4)(B). 9
"5 Section 547(f) presumes insolvency of the debtor for the ninety days prior to the
filing of the petition. This discussion assumes the debtor's insolvency at the time of the
transfer, which does occur during the extended twelve month reachback period for insiders
provided in § 547(b)(4)(B).
16 An additional requirement is that the transfer enabled the creditor to receive more
than he would have received under a Chapter 7 liquidation of the debtor's assets. 11 USC §
547(b). Under § 547(c), transfers for contemporaneous new value or in the ordinary course
of business are not avoidable.
17 The Code defines "creditor" broadly to include any entity with a claim against the
debtor. 11 USC § 101(9). See also Bankruptcy Law Revision, HR Rep No 95-595, 95th Cong,
1st Sess 310 (1977) ("A guarantor of or surety for a claim against a debtor will also be a
creditor, because he will hold a contingent claim against the debtor that will become fixed
when he pays the creditor whose claim he has guaranteed or insured.").
"Claim" is also defined broadly to include any right to payment, whether "reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undis-
puted, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." 11 USC § 101(4). The legislative history sup-
ports this broad reading. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, S Rep No 95-989, 95th Cong,
2nd Sess 22 (1978) (definition contemplates that all legal obligations of debtor can be dealt
with in bankruptcy proceeding); see also HR Rep No 95-595 at 309.
"8 "Transfer" means "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary
or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property." 11
USC § 101(50) (emphasis added). See also Deprizio, 874 F2d at 1195-96.
19 See, for example, Deprizio, 874 F2d at 1189 n 2 and cases cited therein. See also
Matter of Installation Services, Inc., 101 Bankr 282 (Bankr N D Ala 1989) (allowing recov-
ery against both guarantor and creditor).
The University of Chicago Law Review
Th6 presence of an action against Insider is clear in this case,
because Insider is a creditor of Debtor. (This factor will be varied
in the hypothetical in Section II, making avoidance ufider the.pref-
erence provision more difficult.) But while recognizing the action
against Insider, many courts on these facts would deny a recovery
against Bank, ignoring the fundamentally self-dealing ° nature of
Insider's conduct.2 Resolution of Bank's liability as the initial
transferee of the transfer requires consideration of § 550, the liabil-
ity provision.
A. The Legislative Background
The Code has separate provisions for identifying an avoidable
preference or fraudulent conveyance and for determining who shall
be liable for the preference or fraudulent conveyance once found.
Thus, if a preference is deemed voidable under § 547, it remains
under § 550 to determine from whom the transfer can be
recovered.
The legislative history of § 550 reveals that the original propo-
sal for the liability section permitted recovery only from initial
transferees (Bank, in the hypothetical case). The Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws (the "Commission") proposed that subse-
quent transferees of an avoided transfer also be liable for the
transfer, but it did not include the "for whose benefit" language of
§ 550 that, in addition to the analysis set forth in the preceding
section, is necessary to capture Insider.22 The early versions of
what was to become § 550 mirrored the Commission's draft,23 and
the language permitting recovery from the "entity for whose bene-
fit such transfer was made" appeared only in later drafts. Scholars
20 As used in this Comment, "self-dealing" refers to a transaction that harms the corpo-
ration or its creditors because the transaction would not have been agreed to by a rational,
well-informed decisionmaker loyal to the corporate and creditor interests. See Robert C.
Clark, Corporate Law § 4.1 at 147-48 (Little, Brown, 1986).
21 A number of recent cases have permitted recovery of the avoided transfer in this
hypothetical only from Insider. A few cases have allowed recovery from both Insider and
Bank. See cases cited in notes 28, 29, 32, 34, 41, and 42.
22 Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, HR Doc No
93-137, 93rd Cong, 1st Sess 178-79 (Part II) (1973) ("Commission Report"). The Commis-
sion was established to study the deficiencies in the prior Act and to propose new legisla-
tion. The current Code includes many of the Commission's recommendations. See note 9 for
current text of § 550.
23 See HR Rep No 95-595 at 375-76 (cited in note 17).
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disagree about the relevance of this legislative history to the ques-
tion of whether § 550 allows recovery from Bank.14
Although the history is murky, it may be that Congress in-
cluded the "for whose benefit" clause in order to give the trustee
greater flexibility in recovering the transfer.2 This flexibility does
seem desirable to maintaining the integrity of the collective pro-
ceeding: in order for the Code to serve its purpose of averting the
creditors' race for the debtor's assets, creditors must be confident
that trustees actually will be able to recover fraudulent or prefer-
ential transfers. In cases like our hypothetical, however, Insider
may be insolvent 6 or unreachable by the court. In particular, if
Debtor is closely held, the assets of Debtor may represent most, if
not all, of Insider's assets. Limiting recovery under § 550 in such
cases to parties as to whom the transfer does not meet all the re-
quirements for a preference would necessarily cause a loss to
Debtor's other creditors. If the trustee can reach parties other than
Insider, the likelihood of recovery is increased.
Even if the terms of the statute are unclear, the structure of
§ 550 suggests a bias towards holding liable initial transferees as to
whom a transfer is not preferential (Bank, in this case, because the
transfer occurs outside the ninety-day period applicable to outsid-
ers). The Code provides that the trustee may recover "the property
24 The legislative history of § 550 probably does not dispose of the question whether
Bank should be liable as initial transferee in the hypothetical case. See, for example,
Thomas E. Pitts, Jr., Insider Guaranties And The Law Of Preferences, 55 Am Bankr L J
343, 347 (1981).
At least one commentator has used this history to conclude that recovery from Bank
and Insider should be allowed only when both Bank and Insider supply the factual predi-
cate for the avoided transfer (i.e., a transfer within ninety days that benefits both parties
and under which both parties- fulfill all the requirements of the preference section). See
Note, The Interplay Between Sections 547(b) and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, 89 Colum L
Rev 530, 543-44 (1989). Of all potential results, this one seems the least logical. If the lan-
guage of § 550 is intended only to apply to parties as to whom a transaction is preferential,
then the distinction between initial transferee and ultimate beneficiary in the Code has no
relevance, because both Bank and Insider would be beneficiaries of a transfer that is
avoided as to each of them. It is difficult to understand why legislative history that added
the ultimate beneficiary language only late in the drafting process should be used to resolve
this easy case. Rather, House and Senate reports indicate a focus on transfers in general, not
just those that occur within ninety days of the filing. Furthermore, where statutory language
is clear, the use of legislative history to support a more equivocal result violates standard
canons of statutory construction.
25 See Lawrence P. King, ed, 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 550.02 at 550-7, 550-8 (Bender,
15th ed 1989) ("Collier").
2 If Insider is insolvent, he may have no incentive to avoid personal liability on the
guarantee, but even then Insider is probably not indifferent to the amount of his liability.
An increase in the outstanding claims against Insider should increase the difficulty of his
personal bankruptcy case.
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transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property"
from the initial transferee or the transfer's beneficiary.17 Because
Bank is the initial transferee and alone possesses the actual prop-
erty transferred in this hypothetical, recovery of the value of the
property from Insider can only be granted to the trustee in the
court's discretion. A few bankruptcy and district courts, as well as
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, have allowed recovery from both
Bank and Insider.2" But as the following sections show, most courts
have denied recovery from Bank and required the trustee to pur-
sue Insider, an outcome that inverts both the Code's legislative his-
tory and the structure of § 550.
B. The Judicial Approaches
1. Typical reasoning that denies recovery against a bank.
The courts that deny recovery from Bank cite any number of
three grounds. First, many courts reason that Debtor's payments
to Bank constitute two transfers, one of dollars to Bank and an-
other of an equivalent reduction of Insider's contingent liability.29
These courts conclude that only the transfer to Insider is avoidable
and that consequently recovery must be solely from Insider, the de
facto initial transferee and beneficiary of the transaction.
This "two transfer approach" mistakenly analyzes "transfer"
in terms of benefits received rather than payments made. Focusing
on benefits received does comport with treatment of such transfers
under the old Act,30 but such an approach is misplaced under the
new Code; as noted above, the term "transfer" in the Code looks to
"payments made." More to the point, by bifurcating the transac-
tion the two transfer approach misses a crucial aspect of the hypo-
thetical transaction: the transfer to Bank is motivated in part by
the benefit that accrues to Insider. The two transfer analysis relies
2 11 USC § 550(a)(1) (emphasis added).
28 See, for example, In re C-L Cartage, Co., Inc., 1990 WL 35494 (6th Cir 1990);
Deprizio, 874 F2d 1186; In re Coastal Petroleum Corp., 91 Bankr 35 (Bankr N D Ohio
1988); and In re W.E. Tucker Oil, Inc., 42 Bankr 897 (Bankr W D Ark 1984). The Tenth
Circuit appears to concur in this view. See In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc., 97 Bankr 77
(W D Okla 1988), aff'd without opinion, 892 F2d 850 (10th Cir 1989).
29 See, for example, Midwestern Companies, 96 Bankr at 227-28 (alternative holding);
In re Marketing Resources Int'l. Corp., 41 Bankr 575 (Bankr E D Pa 1984); and In re
Mercon Industries, Inc., 37 Bankr 549, 551-52 (Bankr E D Pa 1984).
30 See Deprizio, 874 F2d at 1196 n 6 (multiple transfers were used to explain recovery
from indirect beneficiaries under the 1898 Act, which on the surface did not allow such
recoveries). See also Pitts, 55 Am Bankr L J at 350-51 (cited in note 2).
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on an intuitive sense of the transaction rather than substantive
analysis of the transfer and of Insider's mixed motives."'
Rather than the two transfer approach, some courts rest de-
nial of recovery from Bank on statutory grounds; the precise statu-
tory grounds given vary, but all are problematic. For instance, one
court has looked at § 550's provision that the "trustee may recover
[from] ... the initial transferee ... or the entity for whose benefit
such transfer was made," and concluded that the use of "or" per-
mits the court to choose between the initial transferee and the
third-party beneficiary; the language of § 550 and its legislative
history clearly indicate, however, that the trustee, not the court,
decides from whom to seek recovery.32 Other courts, purporting to
apply fundamental canons of substantive and procedural law, have
surmised that recovery from Bank is not consistent with the pur-
poses of the Code and have limited recovery to Insider." Still an-
other court read § 550 literally for one aspect of the case but then
admitted eschewing a literal reading of the same provision to deny
recovery from the initial transferee.34
A third characterization, rooted in equity, provides the most
troubling reason for denying recovery from Bank. Operating on the
notion that Bank is the "innocent" beneficiary of Insider's self-
dealing, the courts in these cases invoke "equity" to protect Bank
at the expense of Debtor's other creditors. As discussed in the fol-
lowing section, this characterization misperceives Bank's likely role
"' The term "mixed motives" refers to the situation in which a director, principal, or
other insider of a corporation can influence corporate conduct and also produce a personal
gain. See Clark, Corporate Law § 4.1 at 149 (cited in note 20).
32 For a case reading "or" as granting discretion to the court, see In re Ducilli Formal
Wear, Inc., 8 Bankr Ct Dec (CRR) 1180, 1183 (Bankr S D Ohio 1982). For a case in which
the court concludes that the trustee must elect to sue either the initial transferee or the
beneficiary, but not both parties as jointly liable, see In re Acadiana Electrical Service,
Inc., 66 Bankr 164, 166 (Bankr W D La 1986).
The trustee, not the court, is the subject of the clause in which "or" is used with regard
to recovery. 11 USC § 550(a) ("the trustee may recover... the property transferred, or, if
the court so orders, the value of such property . . ."). The legislative commentary on the
meaning of "or" in the Code states that the conjunction denotes joint, rather than mutually
exclusive, options. 11 USC § 102(5). See HR Rep No 95-595 at 315 (cited in note 17) (" 'or'
is not exclusive"). Collier also supports this reading. 4 Collier 1 550.02 at 550-7, n 8 (cited in
note 25).
3 See, for example, Midwestern Companies, 96 Bankr at 225.
34 See In re C-L Cartage Co., Inc., 70 Bankr 928, 934 (Bankr E D Tenn 1987), rev'd,
1990 WL 35494 (6th Cir 1990) (court "rejects a literal reading of § 550(a)(1) on this point
[whether the bank is liable for a transfer to it that is preferential as to Insider] but adopts a
literal reading on the issue of whether the bank is liable as an initial transferee despite not
being a creditor. Logical consistency does not always make sense in applying statutes meant
to cover a broad spectrum of factual situations.").
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in the transaction; it also misperceives equity's role in bankruptcy
law.
Frequent resort to equity more accurately reflects the role of
bankruptcy courts under the old Act than under the modern Code,
in which Congress sought to codify bankruptcy law in significant
detail. 5 Yet courts have used their discretionary powers under
§ 105 to reach results directly contradictory to the substantive
provisions of the Code, despite conventional notions of the limited
applicability of equity in a statutory scheme.3 6 Moreover, equitable
approaches to bankruptcy are not only largely supplanted by the
Code's statutory network but, where appropriate, constrained by
the Code's particular provisions; to the extent it does contemplate
resort to equity, the Code envisions that it will be used to protect
creditors as a group rather than one creditor at the expense of
other creditors in its class.37 As far back as the eighteenth century,
preference law recognized this collective focus.3 8 The use of equity
to concentrate on the relative culpability of transferees results in
an unpredictable, ad hoc approach to preference law that frus-
trates the congressional desire for a uniform bankruptcy law. Fi-
nally, reference to Bank's supposed innocence directly contravenes
§ 547, which contains no transferee scienter requirement.3 9
" See HR Rep No 95-595 at 174 (cited in note 17); Pitts, 55 Am Bankr L J at 343
(cited in note 24) (noting "maddeningly precise" draftsmanship of Code's preference and
liability sections).
11 Section 105 grants courts the powers necessary "to carry out the provisions of this
title." 11 USC § 105(a).
A frequently criticized Supreme Court opinion under the prior Act, Bank of Marin v
England, 385 US 99, 103 (1966), noted that courts do not read "statutory words with the
ease of a computer" and appeared to grant courts broad discretion in applying equitable
principles. Justice Harlan rejected the majority's use of its equitable powers: "The Court's
disposition of this case may be taken to suggest that whenever equity is thought strongly to
demand relief from the strictures of the Act, further exceptions may be appropriately cre-
ated to the statutory scheme." 385 US at 110 (Harlan dissenting).
Marin does not appear to apply to the modern Code. Norwest Bank Worthington v
Ahlers, 485 US 197, 108 S Ct 963, 968-69 (1988) ("[W]hatever equitable powers remain in
the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised in the confines of the Bankruptcy
Code").
3" Indeed, this policy arises from the very nature of the collective proceeding. See, for
example, HR Rep No 95-595 at 177-78 (cited in note 17); House Judiciary Committee, Anal-
ysis of HR 12889, 74th Cong, 2nd Sess 187 (1936) (discussing equality of distribution as
prime motive of Chandler Amendments to 1898 Act). See also In re Anders, 20 Bankr 468,
469 (Bankr N D Fla 1982) (preference recovery intended to aid those who did not receive
payment within the preference period, not the preferred creditor).
31 See, for example, Harman, 1 Cowp at 119 (although the transfer might be fair as
between the parties, a trader cannot, in contemplation of bankruptcy, give a preference be-
cause "it is a fraud upon the rest of the creditors, and against the general spirit" of the law).
" The Code removed the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement that, under the
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The impetus for courts' use of their equitable powers in such
situations seems to stem from an unsupported sentence in a bank-
ruptcy treatise. Discussing Bank's liability in the hypothetical,
Collier concludes:
[A] literal application of section 550(a) would permit the trus-
tee to recover from a party who is innocent of wrongdoing and
deserves protection. In such circumstances the bankruptcy
court should use its equitable powers to prevent an inequita-
ble result .... [Iff a transfer is made to a creditor who is not
an insider more than 90 days but within one year before
bankruptcy and the effect is to prefer an insider-guarantor,
recovery should be restricted to the guarantor and the credi-
tor should be protected. Otherwise, a creditor who does not
demand a guarantor can be better off than one who does.4 e
Although this analysis is offered without reference to either the
policies or provisions of the Code, its impact on the case law has
been enormous. Collier provides the sole authority for many early
decisions under the Code addressing the recovery issue in an in-
sider guarantee context.4 These early opinions have in turn been
cited as dispositive authority for subsequent decisions, thus creat-
ing a line of cases whose true precedent is one commentator's view
of the use of equity in recovering transfers.42
2. The creditor's bargain and the Deprizio analysis.
When courts use equity to protect banks from preference at-
tacks on transfers occurring between ninety days and twelve
months of the bankruptcy filing, they place great emphasis on the
banks' "prudence" in obtaining a guarantee. It would seem unjust,
prior Act, prevented recovery from a creditor who did not know or have cause to believe
that the debtor was insolvent. Because the creditor's knowledge of the debtor's financial
state "has nothing whatsoever to do with the policy of equality of distribution," Congress
eliminated these provisions. HR No 95-595 at 178 (cited in note 17).
40 4 Collier 550.02 at 550-8 (emphasis added) (cited in note 25).
11 See, for example, In re Cove Patio Corp., 19 Bankr 843 (Bankr S D Fla 1982); and In
re Church Buildings and Interiors, Inc., 14 Bankr 128, 131 (Bankr W D Okla 1981). In a
striking example of the weight accorded the Collier excerpt, the Cove Patio opinion rules in
one short paragraph against recovery from Bank, citing Collier and admitted dicta in
Church Buildings as its only precedents. 19 Bankr at 844.
"' Further cases relying on Collier and its progeny include: In re T.B. Westex Foods,
Inc., 96 Bankr 77, 79-80 (Bankr W D Tex 1989); In re V.N. Deprizio Construction Co., 58
Bankr 478, 480-81 (Bankr N D Ill 1986), rev'd, 86 Bankr 545 (N D Ill), aff'd 874 F2d 1186
(7th Cir 1989); In re Aerco Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr 77, 81-82 (Bankr N D Tex 1985); and
Matter of R.A. Beck Builder, Inc., 34 Bankr 888, 893-94 (Bankr W D Pa 1983).
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in their view, to place in jeopardy the funds of a bank that took
the precaution of contracting for a guarantee, when, because the
transfer occurred outside the ninety-day period applicable to non-
insiders, banks not bargaining for a guarantee are not subject to
recovery. But for reasons discussed below, the Seventh Circuit was
correct when it noted in Levit v Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp.
("Deprizio") that if equitable concerns are relevant at all to liabil-
ity under § 550 in cases of an insider guarantee, they dictate hold-
ing the Bank liable for the consequences of its contractual
bargain.4"
To understand the error of equitable protection of Bank, it is
important, first, to recognize Bank's possible motives for securing a
guarantee. Bank probably did not not obtain Insider's guarantee
for its value as an alternative source of payment. That value seems
minimal, particularly in the case of a closely held corporation
whose Insider has most of his assets tied to the company; if Debtor
is insolvent, Insider likely is too. The more probable explanation
for the guarantee is that Bank sought the guarantee precisely for
the added control over payments that Bank received in the hypo-
thetical case. 44 If so, the likelihood of self-dealing increases because
Bank's motive adds a collusive element to Insider's conduct. In
short, Bank's "prudence" in obtaining the guarantee will often be a
thinly cloaked pursuit of a preference, and giving absolute protec-
tion to Bank merely encourages self-interested conduct by
Insider.45
Other, more rudimentary legal principles also counsel against
invoking equity to exculpate Bank. It is unclear why, for instance,
even if Bank is "innocent," it would be inequitable to apply legal
rules to a voluntary transaction between sophisticated parties.46 If
Bank is paid before other creditors of its class simply because of
13 See Deprizio, 874 F2d at 1198. See also Pitts, 55 Am Bankr L J at 354-56 (cited in
note 24).
44 See, for example, Isaac Nutovic, The Bankruptcy Preference Laws: Interpreting
Code Sections 547(c) (2), 550(a) (1) and 546 (a)(1), 41 Bus Law 175, 196 (1985) (many, if not
most, guarantees are sought for the indirect control of the debtor, not for the economic
value, they provide). See also Pitts, 55 Amer Bankr L J at 354 (cited in note 24) (personal
guarantee of an insider may be better security for repayment than legal interests in a
debtor's property).
45 The potential for abuse by Insider is even more apparent. See, for example, T.B.
Westex, 96 Bankr at 81 (debtor is forced to pay judgment awarded to Bank against Insider
because debtor never appears at hearing; court holds that it would be inequitable to require
Bank to return funds to debtor). One suspects that the insider in this case had a significant
influence on the debtor's failure to appear at the hearing.
11 See Deprizio, 874 F2d at 1198; and In re Coastal Petroleum Corp., 91 Bankr 35, 37
(Bankr N D Ohio 1988).
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the contingent liability of Insider, that result conflicts with the in-
tent of preference law.
Morever, even if Bank is held liable for the preferential trans-
fer, it is still better off than other creditors of its class who did not
bargain for Insider's guarantee. After disgorging the transfer, Bank
still has a claim against Insider on the guarantee for the balance of
the loan remaining after its pro rata share in the collective pro-
ceeding. Other creditors will receive only their proportionate share.
This secondary claim against Insider reflects the bargain between
Bank, Debtor, and Insider. If Insider is financially unable to pay
Bank, surely Bank, not Debtor's other creditors, should bear any
loss resulting from Insider's inability to perform on the
guarantee. 7
C. The Characterization Problem
These judicial analyses of three party transfers demonstrate
the importance to the Code of how courts characterize the nature
of the contested financial transaction. To an extent, courts already
observe this responsibility. When, as illustrated above, courts iden-
tify a preference to Insider in the transfer to Bank, they do not
limit themselves to a narrow view of the transfer as a mere cash
disbursement to Bank by Debtor; rather, on such facts courts dis-
regard the mere form of the transfer and recognize that it creates a
benefit to the third party-the reduction in Insider's contingent
liability. This benefit to Insider is not immediately suspect under
the Code, since what Insider receives is a decrease in his liabil-
ity-the right to keep his funds-rather than an absolute increase
in his assets.48
In its most general form, this characterization inquiry asks
who pays for the transfer and who benefits from it. 49 The language
of the Code's preference and liability provisions encourages courts
to look beyond the initial transferee and the formal steps of a
transaction to determine the allocation of costs and benefits. A
court that does not pursue this inquiry fails to protect the credi-
tors who cooperate in the collective bankruptcy proceeding.
11 See, for example, Coastal Petroleum, 91 Bankr at 37 (implying that only when In-
sider is not creditworthy will Bank be worse off, and Bank is best positioned to determine
Insider's creditworthiness).
1s This observation, already accepted by most courts, will be important to the charac-
terization of the hypothetical discussed in Section II.
"' For a discussion of this principle as the basis for characterization of transactions in
the context of fraudulent conveyance law, see Comment, Guaranties and Section 548(a)(2)
of the Bankruptcy Code, 52 U Chi L Rev 194, 205-07 (1985).
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Although principles of corporate law, such as self-dealing, will
help courts recharacterize transfers like the one in this hypotheti-
cal, the analysis need not ignore the language of the Code, for re-
covery from Bank is technically consistent with the relevant provi-
sions. In this hypothetical, the trustee clearly has a cause of action
under the preference provision. The trustee will face the problem
of recovery only in the second phase, when equity and bifurcation
of the transfer's benefits are used to avoid the literal meaning of
§ 550, the liability provision. But, as Section II will illustrate, the
characterization problem remains at its core identifying the cause
of action itself.
II. THE LIMITS OF PREFERENCE LAW IN AVOIDING INSIDER
TRANSFERS
Although §§ 547 and 550, properly applied, capture the sub-
stance of the first hypothetical, a slight variation in the facts indi-
cates that the reading of § 550 developed above does not resolve all
the characterization problems that inhere in these three party
transactions." The broad reading of § 550 merely provides an al-
ternative source of recovery for what is already determined an
avoidable preference under § 547. A sophisticated insider can es-
cape preference liability altogether by failing to satisfy the require-
ments of § 547; yet the transaction in substance may be identical
to the model case in Section I.
Suppose that in addition to guaranteeing the loan by Bank to
Debtor, Insider explicitly waives his rights of reimbursement and
equitable subrogation against Debtor.5 1 The urgency of avoiding a
transfer in this case is arguably greater, because Insider has no
claim against Debtor in the event of Debtor's failure to pay Bank;52
now, because he remains ultimately liable, Insider has an increased
economic incentive to assure payment by Debtor to Bank. Indeed,
because of this increased pressure on Insider, Bank will prefer this
50 The transaction discussed in this section is alluded to in Deprizio, 874 F2d at 1190 n
4, 1192-93, but the court did not resolve the issue.
I" Such a waiver could be explicit in the loan agreement or might inhere in the label
applied to Insider's role in this transaction. For example, if Insider were a co-maker of the
note, he might have no right of reimbursement from Debtor. Insider might also waive these
rights after the original agreement but before payments to Bank.
52 See Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Cases, Problems, and Materials on
Bankruptcy 448-49 (Little, Brown, 1990); and David I. Katzen, Deprizio and Bankruptcy
Code Section 550: Extended Preference Exposure Via Insider Guarantees, and Other Per-
ils of Initial Transferee Liability, 45 Bus Law 511, 531 (1990) (waiver strengthens lender's
vicarious control over debtor).
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arrangement if, as hypothesized above, it seeks Insider's guarantee
to gain increased control of Debtor's funds. At the very least, even
if operating with pure motives Bank would be indifferent between
the two hypothetical schemes, because Insider's ability to recover
from Debtor has no impact on whether Bank is paid. In short, this
is a transfer the Code should reach, as surely as it reaches the
transfer in the hypothetical in Section I. Whether it does, the fol-
lowing section shows, is unclear.
A. The Hard Edges of Preference Law
Assume that under these slightly modified facts, Insider once
again instructs Debtor to pay on the ninety-first day prior to filing.
Seeking to recover this transfer, the trustee turns, as under the
first hypothetical, to § 547. But this time the trustee most likely
has no recourse under the provision, for one of the crucial elements
to recovery under the preference provision-Insider's creditor sta-
tus-is gone. Now that Insider has waived his rights, traditional
interpretation holds that he no longer is a creditor of Debtor.5 3
Thus, the insider in the second hypothetical seems to have de-
feated the Code by adopting a form whose substance is identical to
the invalid transaction in Section I, but which falls outside the pa-
rameters of preference law.
If this conclusion is correct, Debtor's other creditors will bear
the cost of the benefit to Insider, who has undermined the collec-
tive process through a minor variation on an illegitimate transac-
tion. Indeed, if this second hypothetical transfer cannot be
avoided, the trustee's ability to reach Insider in the first hypotheti-
cal becomes moot, for informed insiders would eschew creditor sta-
tus to escape the substantive preference provisions. The waiver ef-
fectively immunizes Insider, despite the extended reachback
period.
Two hard-edged elements of § 547 combine to produce the
problematic result discussed in this section. First, the ninety-day
limit on the reachback period for non-insiders makes the transfer
non-preferential as to Bank. Thus, the trustee's sole hope of iden-
tifying an avoidable preference is to pursue the benefit received by
Insider. But Insider falls outside the second requirement of the
preference provision-that the transfer sought to be avoided in-
volve a creditor of the debtor-since he technically is not a credi-
51 "Creditor" as defined in the Code includes all parties with any claim against the
debtor. See note 17.
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tor of Debtor. If the transfer does not benefit a creditor, preference
law is inapplicable.
Preference law therefore provides an insufficient remedy for
self-dealing by Insider on the eve of bankruptcy. 4 The hard edges
of the provision do not always capture transfers that are in essence
preferential; they allow an escape for transfers whose substance is
identical to the first hypothetical.
The apparent inadequacy of preference law in this regard is
troubling. One possible recourse for the trustee is to seek to estab-
lish Insider as a de facto creditor of Debtor, arguing as follows:
Insider's liability is contingent on Debtor's conduct; because In-
sider may have a disputed (i.e., colorable) claim against
Debtor-who, after all, received the benefit of his guarantee-he
ought to be regarded as a creditor of Debtor for purposes of the
preference provision.5 This argument in effect forces a claim on
Insider against Debtor, thus meeting the requirements of the pref-
erence provision and creating a cause of action. Although the result
is satisfying, courts are likely to reject the convoluted characteriza-
tion it entails. For one seeking a principled analysis of transac-
tions, this approach is no more acceptable than those offered by
Collier and the ensuing line of cases discussed in Section I. What is
needed is a new analytic framework, one that takes in a course of
conduct slightly more clever but no less undesirable than the pat-
tern represented by the first hypothetical.
B. An Historical View of the Problem: Dean v Davis
The characterization problem in the preceding example is re-
flected in Dean v Davis, a prominent Supreme Court opinion
under the prior Act.56 Jones, a farmer, used forged notes to borrow
money from a bank. When it discovered the fraud and realized
Jones's inability to repay the loan, the bank threatened to have
Jones arrested unless he immediately repaid the loan in full.
', See Thomas H. Jackson and Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An
Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditor's Bargain, 75 Va L Rev 155, 170 (1989).
5 This analysis essentially recognizes a right to indemnity on behalf of Insider against
Bank. Courts have considered such an approach in the context of other financial obligations,
such as a manager's personal liability for a corporation's payment of employee withholding
taxes. See Reid v United States, 558 F Supp 686, 688 (N D Miss 1983) ("A right to indem-
nity arises when one party is exposed to liability by the action of another who, in equity or
in law, should make good on the other's loss.").
5- 242 US 438 (1917). For a general overview of the importance of Dean in modern
bankruptcy law, see Thomas H. Jackson, The Continuing Life of Dean v. Davis, 1988 Ann
Surv Bankr L 63.
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Pledging all his assets, which amounted to five times the loan
value, Jones borrowed money from his brother-in-law, Dean, and
used the loan proceeds to repay the bank. Jones then defaulted on
the loan from Dean, who kept the collateral." Davis, Jones's trus-
tee, sought to recover the collateral.
The Court held that only the bank had received a preference,
because no antecedent debt existed between Dean and Jones.5 s
That is, Davis was unable to reach Dean under the 1898 Act on the
preference claim because of the same technical. aspect of prefer-
ence law that our hypothetical trustee confronts under the Code:
the requirement of an antecedent debt (creditor status) between
Jones and Dean. Davis could, of course, have avoided the transac-
tion between Jones and the bank, but this was only a partial rem-
edy because Jones's other creditors still lost the collateral-all of
Jones's property-that Jones mortgaged to Dean.
Confronting this dilemma, the same as posed by the second
hypothetical above, the Court permitted recovery from Dean on
other grounds: it held that Dean had received a fraudulent prefer-
ence, and ruled in favor of the trustee. The Court's conclusion that
an advance by Dean enabling Jones to make a preference "presents
an element upon which fraud may be predicated"59 represents an
important melding of preference and fraudulent conveyance law
for the characterization of three party transactions. The Dean ap-
proach captures both Jones's motive and the transfer's substance.
It should be noted that a less wooden characterization of the
transaction in Dean would permit resolution of the case under the
preference provision of the Code, though not under the earlier Act.
The Dean Court chose to view each transfer of Jones's property
(the collateral to Dean and the cash to the bank) as a separate
transaction. Under the approach developed in Section III of this
Comment, however, these transactions might be collapsed and
then characterized as a transfer of Jones's property to Dean, an
insider of debtor Jones, for the benefit of the bank. Under the
Code both Dean (as the initial transferee) and the bank (as the
ultimate beneficiary) would be liable for a transfer of the debtor's
assets constituting a preference to the bank. Thus, the Court's
5" In the actual case, the mortgages of Jones's property to Dean were dated to establish
a default shortly after Dean loaned Jones the money. This element of fraud makes the trus-
tee's case against Dean for receipt of a fraudulent conveyance more persuasive, but is not
important for this analysis. See Dean v Davis, 242 US at 442.
" In its often-quoted holding, the Court stated, "The bank, not Dean, was preferred."
Id at 443.
59 Id at 444.
1990]
The University of Chicago Law Review [57:603
holding that the bank rather than Dean was preferred would not
necessarily prevent the trustee from avoiding the transfer of assets
to Dean."0
Although the excessive value of the collateral for the loan in
Dean made the parties' fraudulent intent unmistakeable, all trans-
actions involving insiders should likewise be subject to close judi-
cial scrutiny and the general principles of fraudulent conveyance
law. Even where the incongruity of value that existed in Dean is
not present to raise the court's suspicions, judicial attention should
be attracted by another aspect present in Dean and other cases of
its kind: the self-dealing nature of the transfer.
Under pressure from the bank, Jones initiated the transfer to
stay out of jail, undoubtedly to his significant personal benefit but
of limited benefit to Jones's other creditors, who lost the entire
estate in the transfer. From the perspective of the creditors as a
group, Jones conveyed all his assets to Dean and-received in return
only a fraction of their value, which was paid to the bank, an un-
secured creditor. Similarly, in the hypothetical case, Debtor's pay-
ments on the loan benefit Insider more than they do Debtor, at
least to the extent they exceed Bank's pro rata share." Debtor's
other creditors capture only some of the benefit of the payments,
60 Importantly, the above characterization would be the only way of avoiding the trans-
fer of collateral to Dean had Jones mortgaged his property to Dean, and then directed Dean
to pay the bank. In that case, Dean's payment to the bank would not have involved any of
Jones's property and therefore could not itself be deemed a preference. In addition, a fraud-
ulent conveyance under the Act required proof of intent, not merely failure of equivalent
value. Because Dean might have extinguished Jones's antecedent debt in good faith, the
trustee might not have succeeded in recovering the property unless the court collapsed these
two transfers into a single transaction-the satisfaction of the debt owed by Jones to the
bank.
The issue also arises in a similar three party transaction, the letter of credit. In effect,
these transfers convert an unsecured claim of a supplier into a secured claim of the bank,
just as Dean received a secured debt in place of the bank's unsecured claim. Under the
prevailing judicial view, if an antecedent debt is paid off by use of a letter of credit, the
issuing bank will not be held liable if the transfer is avoided. See, for example, In re Air
Conditioning Inc. of Stuart, 845 F2d 293 (11th Cir 1988); and Matter of Compton Corp.,
831 F2d 586 (5th Cir 1987). See also Katzen, 45 Bus Law at 526-27, 535-36 (cited in note
52).
This result seems to directly contradict the substance-over-form analysis and also to
ignore the allocation of risks in a letter of credit. Despite the Compton court's assertion that
the transfer of the security interest to the bank is for the "sole benefit" of the bank, 831 F2d
at 589, the very purpose of a letter of credit issued on an antecedent debt is to protect
(benefit) a previously unsecured creditor. This suggests that the bank assumes not only the
risk of the debtor's insolvency, 831 F2d at 590, but also the risk of any preference attack
related to payment of the antecedent debt.
61 Given the time value of money, the actual size of the benefit to Debtor should be less
than the amount of Bank's pro rata share.
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yet only Debtor's funds are used to pay off the loan. Indeed,
Debtor overpays just as Jones did. Were Bank required to seek sat-
isfaction in the bankruptcy proceeding, it would, by hypothesis, re-
ceive less than one hundred cents on each dollar owed and would
also lose the use of the funds for the intervening months or years
before the Chapter 7 liquidation.2
The overpayments in Dean and the hypothetical appear
designed to benefit Jones (who stays out of jail) and Insider (who
escapes personal liability), but not to give any real benefit to the
debtor or the other creditors. Absent these benefits, it seems un-
likely that a debtor would engage in either transfer.
III. THE APPLICATION OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE LAW
The application of fraudulent conveyance law to three party
transfers has more to recommend it than its functional value. The
sense that such transfers ought to be avoided under preference law
stems from the intuition that Insider's chief goal is to escape per-
sonal liability on his guarantee. In a non-bankruptcy setting, suspi-
cion of such a motive would prompt a court to explore both the
substantive and procedural aspects of the transaction to determine
whether it resulted in an arms-length bargain.63 Moreover, the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA"), the non-bankruptcy
regime's analogue to the Code's fraudulent conveyance provision,
emphasizes the insider's conduct and inquires into his intent in an-
alyzing a suspect transfer.6 4 By looking to fraudulent conveyance
law when similar circumstances arise in the bankruptcy setting,
courts would be promoting the orderly, consistent transition from
the individualized creditor remedies of the non-bankruptcy regime
to the collective rights of the bankruptcy case that the Bankruptcy
Code itself is meant to provide.6
2 Particularly if Debtor seeks to reorganize its business operations, the lost liquidity
resulting from the early repayment to Bank is itself a significant cost to a cash-strapped
organization with fragile lines of credit.
13 For examples of corporate law statutes that regulate transfers involving conflicts of
interest, see Del Gen Corp Law § 144 (8 Del Code Ann, 1983) (interested director transac-
tions); Rev Model Bus Corp Act § 8.31 (1984) ("RMBCA"); ALI, Principles of Corporate
Governance, Tent Draft No 5 § 5.02 (1986).
"4 Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act § 5(b) (1984).
" On the fiduciary duties of directors and officers in a non-bankruptcy setting, see, for
example, RMBCA § 8.42 (cited in note 63). One commentator has noted that fraudulent
conveyance law implicates "a coherent set of conceptually distinct moral principles that
should govern the conduct of debtors toward their creditors . . . Truth, Respect, and Even-
handedness." Robert C. Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90
Harv L Rev 505, 561 (1977). These duties seem quite similar to the ordinary fiduciary duties
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The fraudulent conveyance provision, § 548, permits the trus-
tee to avoid any transfer or obligation incurred within one year of
the filing of the petition if (1) the transfer or obligation was in-
curred with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity"
who is a creditor of the debtor, or (2) the debtor did not receive
"reasonably equivalent value" for the transfer or obligation and
was insolvent at the time, or as a result, of the transfer.6 Under
§ 548(d), securing an antecedent debt can constitute reasonably
equivalent value.
The evidentiary showing required by the provision's intent re-
quirement is, as under the UFTA, a low one, more akin to the fore-
seeable consequences principle of the tort law than the criminal
law's concept of mens rea;61 it is a threshold that transfers affect-
ing insiders may well meet. The references to fraud in Harman and
Dean suggest that both Fordyce's and Jones's transfers would sat-
isfy this requirement, and so should the conduct of Insider in the
hypothetical. As a practical matter, a payment benefiting Insider
made on the ninety-first day prior to filing should shift the burden
of proof to Insider, who would then have to show that his conduct
was not intended to hinder, delay, or defraud any of the other
creditors.
The inquiry into Insider's conduct arises from the suspicion of
self-dealing. A transfer whose substance betrays an intent to bene-
fit a third party rather than Debtor may also be fraudulent be-
cause it fails the "reasonably equivalent value" test of
§ 548(a)(2).68 Although payment of an antecedent debt constitutes
value under § 548, an insolvent debtor's payments outside the or-
dinary course of business that extinguish the debtor's loan may fall
short of reasonably equivalent value because the loan's present
market value is likely to be discounted from its face value. There-
fore, some of the value of the transfer redounds to Insider, not
Debtor.6 9 An inquiry into the allocation of benefits may thus reveal
that the transfer violated the reasonably equivalent value test of
§ 548.
of loyalty and care imposed either by corporate statutes or common law upon directors and
officers of a non-bankrupt entity.
" 11 USC § 548(a).
6 This low standard of intent dates to much earlier case law treating fraudulent con-
veyance. See, for example, Arnold v Maynard, 1 F Cases 1181, 1183-84 (Cir Ct D Mass
1842).
11 For a discussion of the potential limits of § 548(a)(2), see Baird and Jackson, 38
Vand L Rev 829 (cited in note 10).
11 See In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc., 100 Bankr 127, 136 (Bankr D Mass 1989)
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A. The Interplay Between Fraudulent Conveyance and Prefer-
ence Law in the Characterization of an Insider Benefit
In seeking to establish the nexus, crucial to fraudulent convey-
ance law, between Insider's benefit and a detriment to Debtor and
the remaining creditors, one might characterize this second hypo-
thetical transaction in terms of its effect on the collective asset
pool. Under this approach, one would contend that the asset pool
should be regarded as consisting not only of Debtor's assets, but
also of residual claims to be paid by guarantors.7 0 The argument
would run as follows: Insider's conduct allows Bank to recover fully
from Debtor's assets instead of pursuing Insider for the outstand-
ing balance less Bank's pro rata share. If instead Bank were to par-
ticipate in the collective liquidation, it would receive only its pro
rata share, and the remaining creditors would receive a larger ag-
gregate distribution. But the recovery process for Bank would not
end there-it still would have a claim against Insider as guarantor
on the loan. If Insider is solvent and reachable by the court, he will
be ordered to pay Bank the remaining amount, thus increasing the
total funds disbursed to Debtor's creditors. 1 In this sense, then,
Insider's transfer of Debtor's funds to Bank depletes the total
available funds, and through this characterization a fraudulent
conveyance emerges: creditors as a group lose assets because of
Debtor's payment to Bank.
The difficulty with this reasoning is its incorporation of In-
sider's assets into the pool of funds available in the bankruptcy
case. The notion that the total available assets in the collective
proceeding includes residual claims against guarantors of Debtor's
liabilities may be problematic if, for example, Insider is insolvent
or beyond the court's jurisdiction. Bank, from whom recovery
might be sought, could argue that the asset pool had not been de-
(avoiding transfers in connection with a leveraged buyout, court states that reasonably
equivalent value requirement under § 548 means that debtor, not some third party, must
receive the required value).
1o See Baird and Jackson, Cases on Bankruptcy at 449 (cited in note 52).
71 A numerical example illustrates the different effects of the two recovery scenarios on
the creditors' asset pool. Suppose Debtor has $200 in assets and $400 in liabilities, including
a $100 obligation to Bank guaranteed by Insider. In the hypothetical, Bank receives $100
and Insider evades liability because he is not a creditor of Debtor. Thus, the remaining
creditors receive $100, and the total size of the asset pool is $200. But if Bank received only
its pro rata share, $50, then Bank would have received another $50 from Insider, increasing
the collective pool to $250. Creditors of Debtor as a group are better off and Insider is worse
off, a result consistent with the contractual obligations.
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pleted, since Insider's funds were never part of the asset pool
anyway.
The somewhat frustrating effort to reach Insider in the second
hypothetical transaction illustrates the important interplay be-
tween the Code's preference and fraudulent conveyance provisions.
The preference section has sharp, fixed requirements, such as pay-
ment of an antecedent debt and precise reachback periods. Fraud-
ulent conveyance law, on the other hand, relies principally on ei-
ther of two broad concepts: failure to receive reasonably equivalent
value, or intent to hinder, delay, or defraud. All fraudulent convey-
ances, regardless of whether insiders are involved, are voidable if
made within twelve months of the filing. Moreover, fraudulent con-
veyance law's intent requirement is not difficult to meet in the hy-
pothetical case, because at least some courts presume intent from a
foreseeable insider benefit. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, if the
"primary and important benefits" accrued to the insider, a third
party, the transfer fails the reasonably equivalent value test 2 as
well as the intent standard.
B. The Modern Relevance of the Fraudulent Preference
Lord Mansfield noted in Harman that Fordyce's preference of
Fishar was "an act of fraud, contrary to the spirit of the bank-
rupt[cy] laws, and to the injury of his creditors. '7 3 Considering the
policies supporting the preference and fraudulent conveyance pro-
visions of the Code, the concept of a fraudulent preference"4 accu-
rately captures the hybrid character of the financial arrangement
between Bank, Debtor, and Insider in the model case. The trus-
tee's ability to undo the debtor's preferences deters the debtor
from paying a creditor more than his creditor's status entitles him
in the collective proceeding. Section 547 also prevents any creditor
from grabbing the debtor's assets or pressuring the debtor to pay
off his debt. The transaction in the second hypothetical involves
just these sorts of harms: Bank receives more than it would from
Debtor in the collective proceeding, and indeed, if the transfer had
7' Bullard v Aluminum Co. of America, 468 F2d 11, 14 (7th Cir 1972). See Palmer v
Radio Corporation of America, 453 F2d 1133, 1136 (5th Cir 1971). See also In re Vadnais
Lumber Supply, Inc., 100 Bankr 127.
71 1 Cowp at 123.
7 Transfers that benefit insiders have often been regarded as occupying a middle
ground between preferences and fraudulent conveyances, and are sometimes called fraudu-
lent preferences. The overlap between fraudulent conveyance law and preference law is dis-
cussed in a number of judicial opinions under the prior Act. See, for example, Van Iderstine
v National Discount Co., 227 US 575, 582 (1913).
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occurred one day later all the provisions of § 547 would be met and
the transfer would be an avoidable preference as to Bank. Simi-
larly, Insider receives the same type of benefit as in the first hypo-
thetical; if he were a creditor of Debtor, transfers up to twelve
months prior to the filing would also have been voidable. Both In-
sider and Fordyce "preferred" one creditor, and their actions vio-
late the aim of preference law because they promote the asset grab
by creditors.
The relationship between the rationale for avoiding these
transfers and fraudulent conveyance law is more precarious.
Fraudulent conveyance law aims to prevent decreases in the pool
of funds available to creditors. In the model case, the fraud at issue
concerns the benefit that Insider receives without contributing to
the payment to Bank. In a sense, because the payments were to a
creditor of Debtor, the transfer to Bank did not deplete the pool of
available assets: rather, some of the assets were simply used to pay
one creditor instead of another. Because the fraudulent conveyance
provision allows satisfaction of an antecedent debt to constitute
reasonably equivalent value for a transfer, this transfer may not
violate the literal meaning of fraudulent conveyance law. Yet In-
sider's potential self-dealing probably amounts to fraudulent in-
tent under § 548, an alternative to the "reasonably equivalent
value" test. 5 In addition, if one characterizes the payment as an
indirect transfer to Insider, who is by assumption not a creditor of
Debtor, the transfer also fails the reasonably equivalent value test.
As discussed below, such a transfer represents a dividend to In-
sider, a fraudulent conveyance under the Code. Regardless of
whether Bank will be held liable under § 550, the trustee has a
claim against Insider.
Some might object that reinvigorating traditional fraudulent
preference law will defeat the benefits noted earlier of a carefully
detailed Code with clear legal rules. 76 Yet where fraudulent con-
duct is at issue, this objection seems weak. The fraudulent convey-
ance provision of the Code requires courts to consider the insider's
intent in a transfer. Courts already engage in a similar review when
7' Both the UFTA and the Bullard approach, 468 F2d at 14, discussed in text at notes
80-83, recognize fraudulent intent in a transfer whose significant benefits accrue to an
insider.
7' See Matter of Xonics Imaging, Inc., 837 F2d 763 (7th Cir 1988) (protections for
creditors benefit creditors and debtors as a group).
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considering claims for equitable subordination under the Code,
which requires an inquiry into the debtor's conduct.7"
Section I developed an approach that permitted a coherent
characterization of three party transfers for purposes of the liabil-
ity provision, § 550. But broadening liability without recognizing
the insider's possible conflict of interest merely alters the form of
conduct engaged in by the parties, not its substance;7 the analysis
developed in Section I pushes the characterization problem toward
its proper conclusion, but by itself is not a quick fix for the avoid-
ance of preferential or fraudulent transfers involving an insider.
Unless courts recharacterize transactions in light of Insider's po-
tential self-dealing, the benefit of a broad recovery provision will
be lost, for courts will fail to reach alternative forms of substan-
tively similar arrangements. Courts must incorporate the notion of
a fraudulent preference when characterizing these transactions, or
differing forms of a transfer will continue to produce inconsistent
judicial outcomes, and many arrangements will continue to escape
through the cracks in the Code.
C. The Corporate Law Analogies: A Reevaluation of Dean and
the Insider's Guarantee
The conduct at issue in Dean continues to pose analytical dif-
ficulties under the Code. The Dean Court viewed Jones's financial
dealings as two separate transactions: borrowing money from Dean
and paying off the bank. Principles of corporate law, how-
ever-including self-dealing, improper distributions, and height-
ened scrutiny of insiders' dealings with the firm-can help courts
identify fraudulent or preferential motives in a transaction such as
this, and to collapse the transfer into a single analysis of payor and
beneficiary. In the hypothetical case, Debtor transfers a sum of
money but only receives some of the benefits of the transfer. In-
sider, on the other hand, pays nothing and benefits to an arguably
7 11 USC § 510(c)(1) (authorizing equitable subordination by bankruptcy court). See,
for example, Matter of Clark Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., 893 F2d 693, 699 (5th Cir 1990)(re-
quirement of inequitable conduct satisfied by fraud, illegality, breach of fiduciary duties,
undercapitalization, or claimant's use of debtor as alter ego); and In re Bellanca Aircraft
Corp., 850 F2d 1275, 1282 n 13 (8th Cir 1988) (where subordination of insider's claims is
sought, trustee need only prove that insider breached a fiduciary duty or engaged in "un-
fair" conduct). See also Clark, Corporate Law § 2.3 at 53-54 (cited in note 20).
78 The second hypothetical illustrates such a case. The problematic characterization of
letters of credit (see note 60) similarly encourages banks to insist on use of this instrument,




greater extent than Debtor, because without the transfer Debtor
could default on the loan, file for bankruptcy, and force Insider to
pay Bank for any remaining balance on the note. In these and
other instances, courts must be prepared to employ principles of
corporate law to collapse the phases of the transfer and focus on
the benefits to the parties involved.7 9
At least one appellate court has followed this treatment of
transactions among a debtor, a creditor, and an insider.8 0 The Sev-
enth Circuit in Bullard v Aluminum Company of America ana-
lyzed a factual scenario l similar to the hypothetical by collapsing
the transfers among the three parties to determine who received
benefits from the transaction and who paid for them. Not surpris-
ingly, the court found that payments by the debtor on amounts
guaranteed by debtor's insider benefited the insider as well as the
debtor. The holding relies largely upon the suspect nature of the
transaction, which gave a gain to the insider, whose liability on the
debt had been reduced to a judgment against him, and whose ben-
efit was financed by the debtor.,2 The court did not consider
whether the transfer was preferential,13 but did find the payments
79 It may be, as one commentator has argued, that the drafters of the Code failed to
consider three party arrangements, Comment, 52 U Chi L Rev at 204 (cited in note 49), and
no principled response to them exists under the present regime. But this sort of oversight by
the drafters seems unlikely, as three party transfers and the problems they pose were hardly
novel when the Code was drafted in 1978. The language of § 550, moreover, which speaks of
initial transferees and ultimate beneficiaries, and of § 547, which identifies transfers "to or
for the benefit of another," suggests that the Code seeks to capture the substance of com-
plex financial arrangements.
8 Bullard, 468 F2d 11. Bullard was decided under the prior Act, but for purposes of
this analysis the differences between the Act and the Code are not material. The Bullard
opinion does not use the language of self-dealing.
8 The actual agreement in Bullard involved a number of closely held organizations, a
trade creditor, and an insider of these organizations; for purposes of the discussion, a simpli-
fied form is presented. 468 F2d at 12-13.
Although the court does not discuss the issue, the insider in Bullard may have had a
right of reimbursement from the insolvent debtor. It is precisely the irrelevance of the
right's existence (and hence creditor status) that makes the case informative for this
discussion.
11 468 F2d at 14 ("We find most significant the relationship of the parties to the settle-
ment agreement and the respective allocation of its benefits."). Similar concerns have
caused courts to collapse transactions when analyzing leveraged buyouts in a bankruptcy
proceeding. See, for example, United States v Gleneagles Investment Co. Inc., 565 F Supp
556, 573-77 (M D Pa 1983), aff'd sub nora US v Tabor Realty Corp., modified, 803 F2d 1288
(3d Cir 1986).
83 468 F2d at 14. One suspects that the trustee did not seek recovery on preference
grounds because the transfer occurred eleven months prior to the filing of the petition. Id at
12-13. The preference provisions of the prior Act did not provide an extended reachback
period for transfers involving insiders.
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to the trade creditor to be a fraudulent conveyance as to the
insider.
Where an insider receives a benefit from a transfer to a non-
insider during the extended reachback period of § 547(b)(4)(B),
the court should inquire into the possibility of self-dealing. If, for
instance, the transfer to Bank provides other benefits to Debtor
besides extinguishing the debt, then self-dealing seems less likely.
Thus, if Bank were an important trade creditor whose goods were
essential to Debtor's operations, the transfer might not constitute
self-dealing. Similarly, some who qualify as insiders under the
Code may receive a benefit but not exert any control over Debtor's
decision to make the transfer. Here, too, inquiry into the parties'
conduct reduces or eliminates the fear of self-dealing and suggests
that recovery would be unnecessary.14
The benefit to Insider in the model case can be characterized
as a dividend that violates both the Code's fraudulent conveyance
law and corporate law regarding shareholder dividends. So charac-
terized, the fraudulent nature of the underlying transfer becomes
more apparent.8 5 Even without a bankruptcy filing, disbursements
to shareholders of insolvent corporations violate corporate law.8 6
The Code prioritizes claims to effectively bar any dividend pay-
ments by Debtor. Thus, quite apart from whether recovery is al-
lowed against Bank in such a case, the trustee should be able to
reach Insider.
But if the fraudulent conduct of this transfer is apparent, it is
the peculiar nature of the dividend which makes characterization
difficult. Insider receives no property from Debtor, who transfers
property to Bank. The benefit to Insider consists of his release
from a contingent obligation, essentially the right to keep his
funds. This benefit precisely mirrors that identified as a preference
" Lord Mansfield himself noted the need for such an inquiry: "[I]f a preference were
only consequential, the case might be different: as if a payment were made ... in pursuance
of a prior agreement." Harman, 1 Cowp at 125.
" At least one court has identified the payment of a dividend to benefit an insider
entity as a fraudulent conveyance. Wells Fargo Bank v Desert View Building Supplies, Inc.,
475 F Supp 693, 695-97 (D Nev 1978), aff'd without opinion, 633 F2d 225 (9th Cir 1980)
(analyzing a complicated series of transactions involving Desert View (the bankrupt), its
parent company, and Wells Fargo Bank, the court characterized the transfer as a dividend
from Desert View to the parent company through the bank).
86 Distributions are generally limited either by a capital test, which prohibits disburse-
ments to shareholders that diminish capital to an amount less than current liabilities, or by
a source-of-funds test, which prohibits disbursments unless they are paid out of net profits.
See, for example, Del Gen Corp Law § 170(a) (8 Del Ann Code, 1983). The RMBCA also
bars distributions if, as a result of the dividend, the corporation is unable to pay its debts in
the usual course of business. RMBCA § 6.40(c)(1).
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in Section 1.81 Indeed, the analysis in Section I recognizes that In-
sider's benefit need not result from the direct transfer of Debtor's
property to Insider. Furthermore, the preference and recovery sec-
tions both reflect an intent to capture indirect benefits in their "for
whose benefit" clauses. In the second model case, then, a require-
ment that the benefit to Insider relate tangibly to Debtor's prop-
erty seems excessively formalistic. 8 The proposed characterization
treats the transfer of Debtor's property as producing two benefits,
just as the Deprizio analysis of Section I did in finding Bank liable.
The Code itself mandates heightened scrutiny of conduct by
an insider. The inquiry must focus on the insider's possible mixed
motives and the allocation of benefits flowing from the transaction.
In this analysis, analogies to corporate law can help courts charac-
terize the transfer. Just as conflict of interest transactions do not
always prompt courts to void transactions in the non-bankruptcy
setting, all transactions involving benefits to insiders during the
relevant period preceding the filing will not mandate avoidance.
The duties of impartiality and evenhandedness that a debtor in
bankruptcy owes to creditors parallel the corporate law fiduciary
duties of directors and officers of a financially healthy corpora-
tion. 9 A claim seeking to pierce the corporate veil or to nullify a
self-dealing transaction requires inquiry into the insider's course of
conduct and the challenged transaction's allocation of costs and
benefits. Similarly, transfers involving insiders during the pre-filing
period should lead the court to examine both the procedural
(course of conduct) and the substantive (who paid and who bene-
fited) aspects of the transaction.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Harman v Fishar, Fordyce's letter identified his "mere and
sole motive" for paying Fishar as a desire to prefer one creditor
over others.9 0 Nearly 150 years later, in Dean v Davis, a self-deal-
ing motive by an insider was similarly apparent. Such conduct still
8, See text at note 48.
88 The proposed characterization of the benefit reflects the nature of any business
transaction involving more than two parties. A guarantee by one party of a transaction be-
tween two others contains in its very structure a web of interdependent relationships. Such
tripartite arrangements are intended to create interlocking obligations and benefits among
the parties.
89 In the non-bankruptcy setting, conduct must be in the best interest of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders. The analogous "best interest" duty in the bankruptcy setting is
owed to the corporation and its creditors.
90 1 Cowp at 124.
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occurs under the Code. Courts must scrutinize transfers that bene-
fit an insider to determine whether self-dealing is evident, an in-
quiry entailing not only bankruptcy rules for preferences and
fraudulent conveyances but also corporate law principles and the
historical concept of fraudulent preference.
This discussion has demonstrated the elusive nature of charac-
terization under the Code in certain three party transactions pro-
ducing a benefit to an insider of the debtor. While one recent case,
Deprizio, begins to implement a principled approach to the Code's
liability provision in the context of a transaction involving an in-
sider guarantor, the characterization problem exceeded the scope
of the issue under review in that case. There, the concern about
reaching beyond the form of the transfer to uncover its motive and
substance only arose in resolving the liability issue. But at its core,
a court's characterization of a transfer determines whether a cause
of action even exists.
To protect the collective nature of the bankruptcy case, to
prevent the creditors' race for a debtor's assets, and to preserve the
Code's stated goals of equality of distribution and maximization of
the pool of funds available to creditors as a group, courts must
analyze transactions with less concern for supposed equity issues
and greater attention to the true substance of the transac-
tion-who pays and who benefits. Such an approach collapses
transactions in which the three parties are clearly interrelated into
a single transaction involving assets of the debtor.
The prevention of insiders' self-dealing is crucial to the integ-
rity of the bankruptcy process. If indirect arrangements, like the
insider guarantee with a waiver of claims, lead courts to bifurcate a
series of transactions whose substance in fact reflects a single bene-
ficiary and initial transferee, creditors and insiders will merely seek
these arrangements instead of accepting the risks associated with
the collective proceeding. This outcome promotes rather than de-
ters insider self-dealing, the race for the debtor's assets, and the
consequent premature demise of insolvent organizations.
The accrual of benefits to an insider of a debtor from a trans-
fer should signal a heightened substantive and procedural analysis
of such transactions, regardless of whether the insider is also a
creditor of the debtor. But the inquiry must not focus singularly on
traditional preference law. By itself, preference law cannot capture
all transfers with benefits to Insiders which indicate a breach of
the principles of the collective bankruptcy case. Fraudulent con-
veyance law, whose expansive provisions should be informed by es-
tablished principles of corporate law for remedying self-dealing,
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will help courts identify and deal with inherently fraudulent or
preferential conduct under the Code. Such an inquiry, when com-
bined with fraudulent preference law's traditional focus on the
conduct and intent of the insider, can promote the integrity of the
collective bankruptcy proceeding by protecting the interests of the
debtor's other creditors.

